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Public choice, sometimes referred to as the economic theory of
legislation, I applies game theory and microeconomic analysis to the
production of law by legislatures, regulatory agencies and courts. In
general, microeconomic analysis, as it applies to legal problems,
contains two theoretical components-the theory of market ex-
change and the theory of the firm. The theory of the firm posits that
the transaction and information costs associated with contracting
across markets will force production and exchange out of the mar-
ketplace and into organizations called "firms," which are organiza-
tions specifically designed to reduce these costs.2 One of the major
problems with market arrangements arises from the difficulty of as-
suring contractual performance within a market setting. Increas-
ingly economic theory has come to recognize that problems of post-
contractual opportunistic behavior, particularly the danger of ex-
propriation of firm-specific capital investments, explain why certain
transactions take place within firms instead of across markets. Thus,
in many cases, the principal advantage of organizing as a firm is that
such organizations mitigate the costs associated with ensuring that
contracting parties keep their promises.
However, just as intra-firm transactions possess certain advan-
tages over market transactions, the converse also is true for a wide
range of transactions. As Coase points out, there are reasons why
all transactions are not "carried on by one big firm." 3 Simply
stated, the theory of market exchange posits that, as a firm increases
beyond a certain size, high transactions costs, particularly the costs
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1 See Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339 (1988) (using the
terms "public choice" and "economic theory of legislation" interchangeably).
2 Coase, The Mature of the Finn, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 405 (1937). "The main reason
why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem to be that there is a cost of using the
price mechanism. The most obvious cost of 'organizing' production through the price
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are." Id. at 390.
3 Id. at 394.
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of monitoring employee shirking, render efficient deployment of as-
sets within the firm extremely costly. Moving transactions out of
such a firm and into the marketplace reduces the need to monitor
the marginal productivity of particular assets, and thereby reduces
the costs of inefficient asset use.
Market exchange theory posits that market transactions enjoy
two advantages over intra-firm arrangements. First, as the firm
grows, it becomes more likely that the entrepreneur who organizes
and coordinates intra-firm production will fail to deploy production
factors to their greatest value. Thus, "as a firm gets larger, there
may be decreasing returns to the entrepreneur[ial] function. . . .4
Second, in some circumstances, market transactions economize
monitoring costs by eliminating the need to observe the marginal
productivity of particular inputs. Thus, monitoring the marginal in-
crease in productivity, which is often difficult within the firm, be-
comes easier across markets, because markets tend to evince "a high
correlation between rewards and productivity."-5
In sum, those factors that drive certain transactions into the
firm-the "team use of inputs" and the centralization of a "contrac-
tual agent in a team productive process '" 6-will often render it diffi-
cult for the centralized agent to ascertain which components of the
firm structure are pulling their weight. In such circumstances, mar-
ket price mechanisms may be better at providing this information
than the firm. To oversimplify slightly, the firm's advantage is that it
mitigates costs associated with ensuring contractual performance.
The market's advantage is that it reduces monitoring and agency
costs due to its reliance on explicit prices.
Even though the distinction between firms and markets is im-
precise-where the firm ends and the market begins defies neat cat-
egorization 7 -these theories provide a very useful lens through
which to view the production of legal rules. In particular, many of
the most interesting and empirically rich questions in public choice
involve the contracting problems plaguing lawmakers as they seek
to forge binding agreements among themselves. Lawmakers at-
tempt to solve these problems by establishing a firm-like organiza-
tional structure within Congress. The purpose of such a structure is
to ensure contractual performance of deals among congressmen in a
4 Id.
5 Alchian & Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 778 (1972).
6 Id.
7 The most obvious example is the shareholder in the large, publicly held corpo-
rate firm, who obtains a residual claim in a market transaction and cannot direct the
allocation of inputs within the firm, but is generally considered an "owner" for many
legal purposes.
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setting in which agreements are not only nonbinding in a legal
sense; but also where performance is non-simultaneous, in the sense
that one party will be called upon to complete performance before
the other has begun to perform.
Similarly, on the supply side, interest groups may be viewed as
firms that are able to supply political influence to their members.
An interest group will survive and flourish if the political favors it
obtains increase the wealth of its members by more than the costs of
membership in the group. This Article seeks to show how both the
theory of the firm and the theory of market exchange play discrete
and critical roles in the public choice model of legislation. Previous
work uses one theory or the other,8 and generally presumes that the
theories are mutually exclusive tools to use in analyzing the legisla-
tive process. None of the existing literature purports to explain the
relationship between the two theories. As this Article explains, the
theory of market exchange is useful in studying the external market
for law (i.e., the interplay among interest groups and between inter-
est groups and Congress), while the theory of the firm is useful in
studying the internal rules of Congress itself (i.e., the committee
system).
The first section of this Article reviews the public choice litera-
ture that treats the production of laws as a market process. The
following section turns to the emerging literature that views law as
the product of an individual firm-the legislature.
I
THE MARKET FOR LAW
The law-as-market version of the economic theory of legislation
"asserts that legislation is a good demanded and supplied much as
other goods, so that legislative protection flows to those groups that
derive the greatest value from it, regardless of overall social wel-
fare .... -9 In this model, all citizens are both demanders and sup-
pliers of laws,10 but certain citizens share legislative goals with
highly organized interest groups which provide them with an advan-
8 Compare Weingast & Marshall, The Industrial Organization of Congress; or Why Legisla-
tures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets, 96 J. POL. ECON. 132 (1988) [hereinafter
Weingast] (employing the theory of the firm to explain certain structural elements of
Congress), with Tollison, supra note 1 (employing the market model to model certain
political outcomes).
9 Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 263, 265 (1982).
10 See Tollison, supra note 1, at 343 (arguing that in the interest group theory, those
who supply legislation are "individuals who do not find it cost effective to resist having
their wealth taken away .... The supply of legislation is, therefore, grounded in the
unorganized or relatively less-organized members of society." Thus, citizens in this
model may be viewed as coerced suppliers.).
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tage over other citizens in the procurement of favorable legal rules.
The basic thrust of the model is that legislatures use "taxes, subsi-
dies, regulations, and other political instruments ...to raise the
welfare of more influential pressure groups. Groups compete
within the context of rules that translate expenditures for political
pressure into political influence and access to political resources.""II
The model holds that politicians maximize the aggregate polit-
ical support they receive from all interest groups. At the margin, a
legislature will alter a rule if the resulting gain in political support
from some group outweighs any expected loss in support from a
rival group. Thus, contrary to popular belief, the public choice
model is, in fact, inconsistent with the rather primitive "capture the-
ory" of economic regulation which posits that one particular inter-
est group rather than a group of interest groups drives legislation or
regulation.' 2 Competition among rival pressure groups with drasti-
cally differing views about what the legal landscape ought to look
like leads to legislative compromise, not because compromise is in
the public interest, but because it is the most effective strategy poli-
ticians have for maximizing political support. This is because politi-
cians can please certain of these groups only by alienating others,
and will attempt to customize law to maximize the total support they
receive by alienating as few groups as possible.' 3
The major portion of government activity is devoted to the
transfer of resources among citizens. The political support maxi-
mizing regulator or legislator serves both as broker and as entrepre-
neur. As a broker he gains political support by transferring
resources among the various groups in society. As an entrepreneur
he seeks to create groups that he can benefit, in order to receive
political support from them. The discussion above implies not only
that certain sorts of groups are more effective in obtaining desirable
legislation, but also that certain sorts of issues will be most attractive
to entrepreneurial politicians.
A. Groups and Issues Likely to Drive Legislation in the Public
Choice Model
Individuals in search of political influence face two sorts of
costs in organizing an effective political coalition: information costs
II Becker, Pressure Groups and Political Behavior, in CAPITALISM AND DEMOCRACY:
SCHUMPETER REVISITED 124 (1985).
12 See generally Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. ECON. & MGMT. ScI.
335 (1974).
13 See generally Peltzman, Toward a More General Theoy of Regulation, 2 J. L. & ECON.
211 (1976).
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and organization costs.' 4 The information costs to an individual
consist of ascertaining the effects of an issue on his own individual
welfare; identification costs are the costs of identifying other simi-
larly situated individuals who will join him in his quest for legisla-
tion. 15 Individuals have very little incentive even to inform
themselves about the relevant issues in a political campaign much
less to inform themselves about the legislative process on an ongo-
ing basis, or to spend resources to affect that process. This is be-
cause, "[t]he probability that an individual's vote will be decisive in
... [the legislative process] is effectively zero."' 16 The point here is
that, even before we get to the issue of the relative efficiency of in-
terest groups in the political sphere, we must realize that for most
people it simply does not pay to become sufficiently informed on
most issues to have an opinion, much less to attempt to affect the
outcome. Where a piece of legislation will cost a taxpayer $50.00,
and the net cost of obtaining information about the effects of the
legislation (including the opportunity costs of the taxpayer's time,
and the start-up costs of identifying the issue) are greater than
$50.00, no rational taxpayer will obtain the information necessary to
begin to affect legislative outcomes.1 7
Thus, individuals who want to affect the legislative process will
find it advantageous to organize into political pressure groups in
order to economize on the high costs of obtaining information
about the welfare affects of impending legislation. Clearly, groups
that have already organized for one reason or other, and therefore
previously have internalized the costs of organization "will have a
comparative advantage in seeking transfers and will therefore be
more successful in procuring transfers as a result."' 8 Thus labor
unions, trade associations, and corporations, which are already or-
14 R. MCCORMICK & R. TOLLISON, POLITICIANS, LEGISLATION AND THE ECONOMY 16
(1981) [hereinafter R. MCCORMICK].
15 Id. at 17.
16 Lee, Politics, Ideology, and the Power of Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 191, 193 (1988).
17 The term for the concept presented here is "rational ignorance." The "net
costs" referred to in the text are the actual costs of obtaining the information (including
opportunity cost of time) divided by the probability of success in opposing the legisla-
tion.
The gain to a citizen-taxpayer from obtaining a particular political outcome in an
election is equal to the difference between the value to the taxpayer of obtaining his
preferred outcome and the value of obtaining his non-preferred outcome, multiplied by
the probability that a change in an individual's vote will alter the outcome of the elec-
tion. Because this probability is very low, it often does not pay for voters to acquire
information.
In addition, free-rider problems provide disincentives to the acquisition of informa-
tion since individual members of groups will receive only a small share of the gains from
such information acquisition. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 238-
76 (1957); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS 25-35 (1982).
18 R. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 17.
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ganized, will have an advantage in the political process, even though
political advantage was not the reason for their initial formation. 19
Free-rider problems inhibit the efficacy of interest groups in
achieving their ends in the political arena. This is because of the
public good nature of law. Those who stand to benefit if a particular
law is enacted do not suffer a diminution in benefits if they fail to
lobby for its enactment. Organizations not only benefit their mem-
bers by overcoming the informational problems faced by individuals
in the political process, they also benefit their members by employ-
ing a variety of devices to mitigate the free-rider problems that in-
hibit the wealth transfer process. 20
These insights predict that politically successful groups will
tend to be small, relative to the size of the groups taxed to pay their
subsidies. The small size not only helps to overcome free-rider ef-
fects, it also concentrates the benefits of legislative enactments so as
to provide individuals with high incentives to press for legislative
results. This prediction seems consistent with the evidence from the
agricultural industries in different countries. Where agriculture is a
small component of a country's economy as in Japan, Israel, and the
United States, it is heavily subsidized. But where agriculture is a
large component of the country's economy, as in Poland, China,
Thailand, or Nigeria, it is heavily taxed.21
Note that in the public choice model, the ideological underpin-
nings of the governments whose actions are being studied play no
role in determining the substantive legislative outcomes generated.
19 Once organization and information costs are taken into account, it is possible to
understand the nature of the "benefits" that accrue to those citizens who supply wealth
transfers to interest groups. Such people do not of course receive the price paid by the
interest groups who demand the legislation. This price (which comes in the form of
political support, i.e., money and votes) goes to the politicians/brokers/entrepreneurs
who engineered the wealth transfer. The suppliers benefit because they "avoid the time
and trouble of organizing to resist the power of the brokers to take away their dollars
and give them to other groups." R. MCCORMICK, supra note 14, at 21.
20 Members of special interest groups have incentives to free-ride on the efforts of
others in their group, because doing so allows group members to capture any benefits
obtained by others in the group at zero cost. Of course, interest group members will
anticipate this problem ex ante and attempt to develop ways to overcome the potential
free-rider problem. For example, rational labor union members will vote for compul-
sory dues in order to prevent free riding on collective bargaining agreements by non-
dues paying workers. Similarly, other organized groups such as nursing home opera-
tors, mid-wives, doctors, accountants and lawyers will press for licensing requirements,
mandatory testing, and other mechanisms that not only deter entry, but also provide
enforcement mechanisms to reduce free-rider problems. In addition to these formal
enforcement mechanisms, a variety of informal devices, from social ostracism to physical
harassment, are available to mitigate the ever-present spectre of the free-rider. See M.
OLSON, supra note 17, at 17-29.
21 Becker, supra note 11, at 137; R. BATES, MARKETS AND STATES IN TROPICAL AF-
RICA 122-28 (1981); Petersen, International Farm Prices and the Social Cost of Cheap Food
Policies, 61 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 13 (1979).
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Rather, regardless of governmental form, the nature of the interest
groups' pressure on lawmakers determines the shape of the law. 22
In other words, under any form of government, there is a market for
laws. 23 Taking interest groups' preferences as fixed,24 interest
groups and politicians will bargain in a "Coasean world," i.e., in a
world where the only factor that will vary outcomes across ideologi-
cal systems is the level of transaction costs faced by the parties. And
it is the system's constitutional structure that fixes the level of trans-
action costs which interest groups face. Thus, a country's constitu-
tional framework, not its ideology, is the most important exogenous
variable in determining the level of interest group outcomes that
will be generated under any given configuration of interest group
coalitions. 25
The interest group model also has important implications for
laws generally considered to be public-regarding. Pollution control
legislation provides a paradigmatic example. At first blush, public
choice theory would seem to predict that we would never observe
environmental protection legislation because the benefits of such
legislation are spread broadly over the population, while the costs
are borne by a few polluters who enjoy lower production costs if
they can operate their factories free of pollution controls. But keep
in mind that individuals will have even less influence on the imple-
22 Cf Becker, supra note 11, at 141 (assuming that both capitalism and socialism are
subject to interest group pressure, and expressing the belief that capitalism is not "espe-
cially vulnerable to pressure groups."); Tullock, Industrial Organization and Rent Seeking in
Dictatorships, 142 ZErrSCHRIFT FUR DIE GESAMPTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFr (J. INSTITUTIONAL
AN) THEORETICAL ECON.) 4 (1986) (discussing the level of interest group wealth transfer
activity in dictatorships).
23 Clearly the method of expression by interest groups of their preferences for leg-
islation, and indeed the medium of exchange between interest groups and politicians,
will vary across governmental systems. For example, in the Soviet Union interest groups
control both the party membership apparatus and the upper echelons of the military.
See Payne, Marxists, They Love a Man in Uniform, 17 REASON 39,42-43 (Oct. 1985) (arguing
that the military priorities of the Soviet bloc countries are determined by interest group
pressures). In the United States, by contrast, various politicians, who are elected in vary-
ing ways, are subject to widely varying interest group pressures. Congressmen are par-
ticularly sensitive to the preferences of interest groups operating within their home
jurisdictions, while the President is concerned with his national constituency. The polit-
ical support maximizing equilibrium for Congress (and indeed for individual congress-
men) is different from that of the President for virtually every issue. See M. FIORINA,
CONGRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT (1977); D. MAYHEW, CON-
GRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974).
24 Clearly, different socialization processes within different countries and cultures
may shape individual preferences (and hence the willingness to associate with particular
interest groups) in different ways. Where such preference molding occurs, however, it is
not the type of government that affects preferences, but rather the educational and cul-
tural systems.
25 See Macey, Transactions Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model: An
Application to Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471 (1988).
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mentation and enforcement of legislation than on its initial enact-
ment.26 In addition, it is clear that, for an individual with a small
stake in the legislative outcome, the marginal cost of casting a vote
is extremely low. The combination of these two influences should
result in precisely the state of affairs that we observe: a lot of envi-
ronmental legislation (it is a highly publicized problem and it costs
voters little to "ask" for action on it in the electoral process) com-
bined with significant influence by interest groups on the specific
nature and implementation of the environmental programs we ob-
serve. In other words, we will get a lot of environmental legislation,
but it not only will be less effective than it otherwise could be,2 7 it
also will serve to benefit certain interest groups at the expense of
others. 28 As Dwight Lee has observed:
Organized groups often do little to oppose legislation that is po-
tentially adverse to their interests, especially when public opinion
strongly favors the legislation. Well-organized groups often will
"get on board" and "support" legislation that is inimical to their
economic interests. But, as opposed to individuals who voted for
the legislation and who quickly forgot it once it was passed, the
affected organized interests will be unrelenting in their efforts to
influence the day-to-day details of the legislation's implementa-
tion. This influence will typically not be exerted on behalf of the
broad public interest. Government attempts to help the poor,
protect the consumer, and regulate business pricing and practices
provide additional examples of supposedly general interest legis-
lation that is subverted by organized interest groups. The initial
motivation for the legislation may have been dominated by ideo-
logical considerations, but narrow economic concerns motivate
the special interest influence that does so much to determine its
effect.
2 9
26 Contra Lee, supra note 16, at 196.
27 R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE AUToMo-
BILE 85-116 (1986); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, POLLUTION, PRICES AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1975); Lee, supra note 16, at 197.
28 BUREAUCRACY vs. ENVIRONMENT, THE ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAUCRATIC
GOVERNANCE UJ. Baden & R. Stroup ed. 198 1);J. THOMASIAN, THE CLEAN AIR ACT, THE
ELECTRIC UTILITIES, AND THE COAL MARKET (1982); Ackerman & Hassler, Beyond the New
Deal Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE LJ. 1466 (1980) [hereinafter Ackerman];
Pashigian, The Effect of Environmental Regulation on Optimal Plant Size and Factor Shares, 27J.
L. & ECON. 1 (1984).
To take a specific, and striking example, observe the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7626
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)). These amendments contained a "provision guaranteeing that
new sulphur dioxide emission controls for coal-fired utility plans [sic] would not cause
economic harm to eastern and midwestern producers of high-sulphur coal. In effect this
was an 'off-budget' subsidy to regional coal interests, paid for by the nation as a whole."
Robinson, Public Choice Speculations on the Item Veto, 74 VA. L. REV. 403, 417 n.44 (1988);
see also B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 44-48 (1981).
29 Lee, supra note 16, at 197.
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The proposition that interest groups express themselves
through seemingly public-regarding legislation also flows from the
fact that legislation which appears to benefit voters can be enacted
at lower cost than legislation that appears only to benefit some nar-
rowly defined special interest group. As such, interest groups will
prefer to obtain their goals through the enactment of legislation that
is seemingly public-regarding.30 For example, legislation enacted
under the guise of protecting the public from unscrupulous compet-
itors or from the hazards of some vaguely described public policy
danger might in fact be intended to erect barriers to entry and to
impose higher production costs on certain market participants than
on others.
B. The Role of Congressmen in the Public Choice Model
Some exponents of the public choice model reduce the role of
the politician to that of a passive broker in the political process.
These politician/brokers merely translate the aggregated revealed
preferences of previously organized interest groups into law by pair-
ing "those who want a law or a transfer the most [as expressed by
willingness to pay] with those who object the least."3 1
This Article posits that a more accurate view portrays the legis-
lator, not only as a passive broker, but also, and more importantly,
as a political entrepreneur who actively works to gain political sup-
port by overcoming the information and organization costs that
conspire against him. This view suggests that politicians would dis-
cover new issues and seek to explain to constituents how it would be
in their interest to support the politician in his quest to develop the
issue into a legislative agenda. So politicians can be expected to be
in the forefront of the fight for environmental quality and a strong
national defense, because controlling such issues on the legislative
agenda enables the politician to capture a large portion of the polit-
ical support from those groups who will benefit by such laws.
Not only will politicians actively seek out issues to bring to vot-
ers to overcome the problem of information costs, but politicians
can be expected to organize their own interest groups (Jesse Jack-
son's Rainbow coalition, and Claude Pepper's Gray Panthers come
to mind) in order to ameliorate the organizational costs and the
free-rider problems that confront individuals who seek to form
30 See Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutoy Interpretation: An
Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223 (1986).
31 Tollison, supra note 1, at 343 ("[t]he individuals who monitor the supply-demand
process are politicians, bureaucrats, and other political actors. These individuals may be
conceived of as brokers of legislation, and they essentially act like brokers in a private
context-they pair demanders and suppliers of legislation").
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groups capable of obtaining governmental wealth transfers. This
analysis helps to explain lawmakers' strong political support for the
policies and practices of virtually every organized interest group
from the securities industry, to the American Bar Association, to the
labor unions. In addition, entrepreneurial politicians can enact laws
that benefit interest groups by helping them to overcome free-rider
problems.
A multitude of laws reduce the difficulty of organizing activities
of such groups by criminalizing certain practices for those who do
not (or cannot) join these groups.32 Licensing requirements for
lawyers and doctors have been particularly effective at facilitating
interest group solidarity.
A final manifestation of the entrepreneurial politician is re-
flected in the rent-extraction model of political behavior recently
constructed by Fred McChesney. 33 In this model, the politician can
extract the specific and expropriable capital that is an inevitable by-
product of the economic activities of firms and individuals. This ex-
traction takes place where politicians obtain political support, not by
regulation on behalf of interest groups, but rather by threatening to
regulate in ways that will expropriate their specific capital unless
side payments are made in exchange for regulatory forbearance. s4
II
LEGAL RULES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM
Individual and group preferences define the supply and de-
mand curves for legal rules. An important variable in the equation
is the organizational form of Congress itself, which influences those
preferences. Although the Constitution places important con-
straints on Congress' ability to make law,35 it is also clear that the
rules governing the internal organization of Congress play an im-
portant role in the legislative outcomes generated by the political
process. Consistent with public choice theory, Congress' organiza-
tional rules are designed to further the rational self-interest of the
legislators themselves. 36 Interest groups and politicians who wish
32 For example, not only is it illegal to practice law, medicine, or dentistry without
a license, it is also illegal to build a building without a permit, or to serve as an electri-
cian, plumber, architect, cab driver, bartender, beautician, or securities salesman with-
out a license. Federal law also makes it easier for unions to organize, thus increasing
their power and political clout.
33 McChesney, Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theoly of Regulation, 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (1987).
34 See also Tollison, supra note 1, at 361.
35 See Macey, Competing Economic Views of the Constitution, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50
(1987) [hereinafter Macey, Competing Economic Views].
36 D. MAYHEW, supra note 23, at 31:
The organization of Congress meets remarkably well the electoral needs
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to enact interest group oriented legislation in exchange for political
support face several problems. First, individual politicians cannot
enact legislation alone. They must gain the cooperation of their fel-
low lawmakers. Second, severe non-simultaneity-of-performance
problems exist both among politicians, and between politicians and
their constituents. In other words, periodically elected politicians'
election campaigns are not always contemporaneous with interest
group demands upon Congress to render services in exchange for
political support. Similarly, logrolling-the common legislative prac-
tice of giving support to another politician on one issue in exchange
for receiving support on another issue-provides a means of gaining
the cooperation of fellow lawmakers, but it also presents serious
non-simultaneity-of-performance problems; legislators frequently
are called upon to support the agenda of a fellow politician before
the other legislator is compelled to return the favor. Consequently,
"problems of enforcement over time are critically important for un-
derstanding legislatures and cannot be assumed away." T37 The in-
dustrial organization of Congress is specifically designed to solve
these sorts of organizational problems to maximize the levels of
political support attained by individual legislators. 38
Perhaps the most obvious implication of the foregoing analysis
is that congressmen, even those whose own reelection is assured, will favor
rules that strengthen the position of incumbents because patterns of
repeat dealings provide strong incentives for congressmen to ad-
here to previously formed agreements. 39 Even a Congressman cer-
tain to be reelected will still want to deal with others whose
reelection is assured, because their actions are more predictable.
Unfortunately, due to unforeseen contingencies, private informa-
tion, and moral hazard problems, it is clear that repeated interaction
often is insufficient to prevent the breakdown of cooperation. 40
As Weingast and Marshall recently have observed, the commit-
tee system in Congress is designed to solve the enforcement
problems that confront political-support-maximizing legislators. In
particular, suppose you have two groups of legislators; one of these
groups is seeking passage of a discrete piece of legislation such as
the building of a dam, and the other is seeking to have an adminis-
of its members. To put it another way, if a group of planners sat down
and tried to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal
of serving members' electoral needs year in and year out, they would be
hard pressed to improve on what exists.
37 Weingast, supra note 8, at 139.
38 Id.
39 R. AXELROD, THE EvoLUTiON OF COOPERATION (1984); Klein & Leffler, The Role of
Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. EcoN. 615 (1981); Telser, A
Theory of Self-enforcing Agreements, 53 J. Bus. 27 (1980).
40 Weingast, supra note 8, at 142.
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trative agency established to benefit its constituency.4 t The first
group, after building its dam, might pass a new bill revoking the law
establishing the administrative agency. This possibility plainly
makes it less likely that either law will be enacted since the two
groups of legislators may be unable to bind themselves to a mutual
exchange of political support. A non-binding agreement will be
worthless to the legislators.
Nevertheless, a committee system, where each group retains
control over the committee charged with creating laws that benefit
its own constituencies, solves the non-simultaneity of performance
problem. 42 After the dam is built, the politicians who got the credit
for building it will be unable to enact legislation to dismantle the
regulatory agency even if a majority prefers that the regulatory agency be
dismantled. This is because, by hypothesis, the legislators who want
the administrative agency to be established are the legislators on the
committee responsible for reporting out the legislation concerning
the administrative agency. As committee members, they are in
charge of determining whether any legislation banning the adminis-
trative agency ever makes it to the floor for a vote. If the propo-
nents of the administrative agency think they will lose the vote they
will not let the matter reach the floor. In this way they can guaran-
tee that the dam builders will not renege. To summarize, "the re-
stricted access to the agenda [caused by the committee system]
serves as a mechanism to prevent expost reneging." 43 The power of
the committee members is greatly enhanced by a system for commit-
tee membership that allows current members to retain their posi-
tions because the politicians know that, so long as they continue to
be reelected, they can keep the hypothetical administrative agency
41 The example here is drawn from Weingast, supra note 8, at 144. An implicit
assumption is that the legislature has techniques that enable it to influence administra-
tive decision-making. This assumption seems correct. Members of Congress have sev-
eral mechanisms, both statutory and non-statutory, for causing administrative agencies
to bend to their will. Statutory enforcement of the congressional will may be accom-
plished by specifying guidelines for the agency in legislation or by using appropriations
bills as reward or punishment for past agency behavior. Nonstatutory techniques in-
clude the use of committee reports and hearings to convey congressional views on how
the agency should be run. See R. D. ARNOLD, CONGRESS AND THE BUREAUCRACY: A THE-
ORY OF INFLUENCE (1979) [hereinafter R. D. ARNOLD]; R. FENNO, JR., THE POWER OF THE
PURSE (1966); HARRIS, CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 15-45 (1964);
KIRsT, GOVERNMENT WITHOUT PASSING LAWS (1969); A. WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS (1964); Arnold, Political Control of Administrative Officials, 3 J. L.
ECON. & ORGANIZATIONS 279, 280-81 (1987).
42 Here I am assuming that both pieces of legislation are passed. Clearly there is
still a slight non-simultaneity-of-performance problem if both bills are reported out of
their respective committees but not voted on simultaneously. But the timing problem
here is slight. The ongoing problem has been solved.
43 Weingast, supra note 8, at 144.
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in operation by preventing legislation adverse to the agency's inter-
ests from reaching the floor.
The committee system can best be seen as an ingenious method
for solving the non-simultaneity-of-performance problem that exists
in Congress. It provides a way in which congressmen can forego
influence in certain areas for additional influence in other areas,
thereby increasing the aggregate demand for their services from the
particular interest groups most influential in their home jurisdic-
tions. A natural corollary of this analysis is that "legislators [will]
seek assignment to those committees that have the greatest margi-
nal impact over their electoral fortunes."'44 For this reason, it is not
surprising that committee memberships in Congress do not ran-
domly reflect the general membership of the legislature. Legislators
use their committee memberships to strengthen their political base.
Thus it is not surprising that there is a very high correlation be-
tween the jurisdictions of particular committees and the levels of
support shown by the committees' membership for the interest
groups benefitted by the committee. Congressmen on committees
dealing with defense, consumer protection, labor, and the environ-
ment all show high degrees of solidarity with the views of the inter-
est groups most immediately affected by those committees. 45 In
other words, "legislators opt for committees relevant to their con-
stituents' interests ... so as to give their members greater control
over policies with their jurisdiction." 46
The above analysis has yielded a rich array of empirical insights.
First, we would expect that members of committees would be dis-
proportionately successful in bringing to their own jurisdictions the
pork barrel projects generated by legislation originating in their
committees. Consistent with this prediction, Ferejohn found that
each member of the Public Works Committee obtained .63 addi-
tional projects for his state above that of non-members. 47 Similarly,
Arnold found that if a member wants a water and sewage grant for
his or her home state, the chances of success are 80 percent higher if
the member sits on the relevant appropriations subcommittee and
60 percent higher if he or she is a member of the relevant authoriz-
ing committee. 48
Similarly, members of the Armed Services Committees received
a statistically significantly greater share of defense spending than
44 Id. at 145.
45 Id. at 151.
46 Id. at 151-52.
47 J. FEREJOHN, PORK BARREL POLITICS: RIVERS AND HARBORS LEGISLATION, 1947-
1968 (1974).
48 R. D. ARNOLD, supra note 41. Arnold found that if you are on neither committee
your chances of obtaining passage were .176. For members of the Appropriations Sub-
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nonmembers. 49 And, consistent with the model presented here,
and with McChesney's ideas about regulatory forbearance, Faith,
Leavens, and Tollison found that firms located in congressional dis-
tricts with representation on the Federal Trade Commission's over-
sight subcommittees were systematically underrepresented in suits
brought by the FTC.50
In sum, the committee system allows committee members to di-
rect their attention to the interest groups most affected by the activi-
ties of their committee. This in turn enables them to maximize the
political support they receive in exchange for enacting regulation
and in exchange for regulatory forbearance.
The committee system in Congress, like the rules benefitting
incumbents, is designed to make Congress operate more effectively,
not for the public good, but for the good of its membership by re-
ducing the contracting problems that arise due to the non-simulta-
neity-of-performance attributes of the logrolling process.
The point here is that Congress, to the extent that it can set its
own rules for internal governance, can greatly affect the demand for
its own services from interest groups. Moreover, Congress can also
use its power to make external rules (i.e. laws) to control the free-
riding and information cost problems that impede the ability of in-
terest groups to deliver political support to politicians. Seen in this
way, Congress can be viewed as a firm (a partnership) that designs
both its internal rules and external rules so as to maximize the polit-
ical support received by its members.
C. Moving the Model Beyond Congress
To this point the Article has treated Congress as though it were
the sole lawmaking entity in the governmental structure. Clearly
this is not the case. The President has the constitutional power to
veto bills generated by Congress, and the federal courts have the
power to declare congressional acts unconstitutional. Consistent
with the Coase theorem, as well as with the intentions of the Fram-
ers who designed the constitutional system of checks and balances,
committee, the chances were .313, and for members of Banking and Currency, .281.
The differences were found to be significant at the .001 level.
If you are interested in a Model Cities Project, it is even more important that you
find membership on the right committees. For these projects, congressmen on neither
relevant committee had a probability of selection of .29. Congressmen on the Banking
and Currency Subcommittee had a probability of selection of .62, more than twice that
of nonmembers. Members of the Appropriations Subcommittee had a probability of
selection of .86, nearly triple that of nonmembers. Id.
49 Weingast, supra note 8, at 153 (reporting results of an unpublished study by
Michael T. Malone entitled "The Political Determinants of the Flow of Federal Funds to
States and the Impact of Federal Funds on Business Location Decisions").
50 Faith, Leavens & Tollison, Antitrust Pork Barrel, 25 J. L. & ECON. 329 (1982).
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these other governmental branches can raise the transaction costs
faced by interest groups and politicians engaged in the wealth trans-
fer process. 5 1
As for the federal courts, the possibility that a statute will be
intentionally or unintentionally misconstrued during the process of
statutory construction clearly lowers the value to interest groups of
obtaining legislative wealth transfers in the first place. 52 When
courts invoke such public-regarding tenets of statutory construction
as the plain meaning rule and the rule that "statutes in derogation
of the common law shall be rigorously construed," the odds of mis-
construction of special interest legislation go up.53 Where tech-
niques of statutory construction raise the probability that certain
interest group oriented statutes will be invalidated by courts, or will
be construed by courts in such a way that the special interest group
does not receive the full benefit it expected from the legislation, the
value of-and hence the demand for-special interest legislation de-
clines. Similarly, of course, as the probability that a statute will be
invalidated as unconstitutional goes up, the willingness of interest
groups to pay for it goes down.54 As judicial deference to legisla-
tures goes up, as it has in recent years,55 one would expect the de-
mand for legislation by interest groups to rise as well.
The analysis of the role of the federal courts presented above
applies in an even more straightforward fashion to the presidential
veto power. As the odds of a presidential veto of a particular bill go
up, the value of the legislation to the relevant interest groups will be
expected to decline, due either to a reduction in the expected bene-
fits or an increase in transaction costs, according to the possibility of
purchasing executive acquiescence.
The problem with respect to administrative agencies is analo-
gous to that discussed above for the judiciary. Here again, the stat-
ute may not be given the effect as bargained for in the "contract"
made between the special interest group and the legislature. The
51 See Macey, supra note 25; Macey, Competing Economic Views, supra note 35. As such,
the activities of these branches must be distinguished from the activities of administra-
tive agencies whose actions reduce the costs of invoking the wealth transfer process.
52 It is also possible that the court will construe the statute so as to give a windfall
to the special interest group. In any case, this does not change the analysis. The possi-
bility of deviation from the terms of the agreement between the legislature and special
interest group is simply another factor to be taken into consideration in the cost/benefit
analysis performed by the parties (i.e., the effect described here is quantitative rather
than qualitative).
53 Macey, supra note 30, at 264-66.
54 The possibility ofjudicial misconstruction or invalidation of statutes is one form
of transactions costs.
55 Cf Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Political Con-
sequences ofJudicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REV. 373 (1988) [hereinafter Riker).
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value of the legislation to the special interest group changes as the
discrepancy between the expected action and the actual administra-
tive action increases. However, it seems clear that, to the extent ad-
ministrative agencies interject themselves into the lawmaking
process, their activities do not upset the contractual agreements be-
tween interest groups and Congress to the same degree as the ac-
tions of the executive and judicial branches. 56
Nevertheless, Congress is not powerless to reduce the
probability of judicial invalidation or presidential veto of its stat-
utes, or to constrain administrative divergence from its mandate.
With regard to judicial invalidation, the problem Congress faces is
that a particular statute (like the environmental statutes discussed
above) that appears to be public regarding in character (but is in fact
a hidden wealth transfer) will be taken by courts at face value, and
the courts will fail to enforce the legislative bargain that lies nascent
within the statute. The skillful use of legislative history by Congress
can raise the probability that the statute will serve its true special
interest purpose while keeping the political costs of the statute
low. 5 7
The congressional response to the president's veto power has
reached even higher levels of sophistication. Congress generally
can ensure that the deals it makes will not be vetoed by including
provisions that are "full of dubious grants and subsidies" within ma-
jor legislative packages containing measures supported by the Presi-
dent.58 The President "often feels compelled to sign such bills...
rather than risk a breakdown in the work of whole departments."5 9
The lack of a line item veto power appears to facilitate this games-
manship by Congress.60 If the President could veto particular items
within a bill, then he could enact only those portions of legislative
56 See Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL
L. REV. 1 (1982); Macey, supra note 30, at 263-64.
-57 See Macey, supra note 30, at 262-64.
58 C. ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 254 (2d ed. 1960).
59 Id.
60 But see Robinson, supra note 28, at 411-12 (arguing that the President's reluc-
tance to veto major legislation because of particular items reflects indifference rather
than helplessness). Professor Robinson's conclusion here appears to be driven by the
erroneous presumption that exercise of an item veto would entail a net cost to the Presi-
dent because it would involve lost political support from those legislators and their con-
stituents who would be adversely affected. Id. at 412. But as the above analysis shows,
statutes that lack majority support are often enacted through the logrolling and agenda
setting process in Congress. See also Riker, supra note 55, at 382-88 (emphasizing that
the agenda setting ability of congressional committees, who, "by virtue of their control
over voting order, can manipulate the outcome of voting bodies"). Thus in many cases,
exercise of a line item veto by the President will garner him a net gain in political sup-
port).
In addition, the fact that the President represents a different constituency from the
agenda setters in Congress is relevant here. Over a wide range of issues, passing a par-
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packages that he prefers to see become law. While it stands to rea-
son that Congress would engage in bargaining with the President in
the presence of a line item veto, under the current system such bar-
gaining is rarely necessary. At the margin, the need to engage in
this sort of bargaining over legislative deals would raise the cost of
interest group legislation and result in diminished supply.
In the case of a rebellious or confused administrative agency,
Congress has several means to compel or direct desired perform-
ance. First, there are several traditional statutory and nonstatutory
means of control.61 Additionally, Congress may enact rules and
procedures that confine administrative discretion. Such administra-
tive rules may take two forms: broad procedural rules such as the
Administrative Procedures Act or the Freedom of Information Act,
or policy-specific procedural requirements such as the environmen-
tal impact statement or the federal funding of consumer
advocates. 62
The point here is that the existence of an independent judici-
ary, the presidential veto power, and delegation of authority to ad-
ministrative agencies does not detract from our model of Congress
as a firm. Congress will view each of these political entities as exog-
enous constraints whose roles it must take into account when arriv-
ing at the political support-maximizing solution to a particular
legislative problem. To Congress, these institutions simply present
transaction costs to be overcome in the cheapest way possible.
CONCLUSION
This Article has shown the relationship between the theory of
the firm and the theory of market exchange in the emerging public
choice theory of the legislative process. The theory of market ex-
change describes the process by which organized special interest
groups seek laws that transfer wealth from weaker political coali-
tions to themselves. The model posits that interest group activity
determines the shape of the demand curve for legislation. Individ-
ual citizens and less organized groups comprise the supply curve.
Politicians act as brokers and as entrepreneurs in the market ex-
change portion of the public choice model. Their goal is to maxi-
mize their own political support, not only by passing legislation
designed to appeal to particular groups, but also by defining issues
around which newly formed groups can coalesce, and by devising
ticular bill will maximize support for members of a particular congressional committee,
while vetoing the bill will maximize the political support of the President.
61 See R.D. ARNOLD, supra note 41; McCubbins, Noll & Weingast, Administrative Proce-
dures as Instruments of Political Control, 3J. L. ECON. & OR. 243 (1987).
62 See Lee, supra note 16, at 198.
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laws that overcome the organizational problems of high information
costs and transaction costs such as free rider problems among inter-
est group members that plague wealth-transfer seeking interest
groups.
The market exchange model predicts that the legal system will
respond to exogenous factors that alter either the preferences of
established interest groups or else the actual configuration of the
interest groups themselves. The model also posits that the level of
interest group demand for legislation will be directly proportional
to the transaction costs of obtaining a legislative enactment in the
legislative marketplace. The Constitution fixes the level of transac-
tion costs. A bicameral legislature, an independent judiciary, and
the possibility of a presidential veto each incrementally raise the
transaction costs facing interest groups seeking to obtain legislation.
Where interest groups compete in a political marketplace, legis-
lative institutions behave like firms whose output is law. As such,
the theory of the firm, rather than the theory of market exchange,
guides the public choice analysis of legislative institutions such as
Congress. Like all firms, Congress organizes its internal affairs to
minimize the costs of assuring contractual performance. In particu-
lar, a congressman who engages in vote trading with another con-
gressman may overcome acute non-simultaneity-of-performance
problems by means of the committee structure, which makes it very
difficult for the bargaining congressman to renege. Similarly, the
committee system itself is a method of organizing team production
to maximize the electoral needs of individual congressmen who face
competition for their seats from nonincumbents.
To develop testable implications for the public choice model
requires that we distinguish between application of the theory of the
firm on the one hand and the application of the theory of market
exchange on the other. Nevertheless, both aspects of the theory
share important common features. Both assume that individuals
making political decisions are not fundamentally different than
those making any private decision about the allocation of resources.
Both theories posit that Congress will design legal rules to benefit
the narrow preferences of discrete interest groups rather than those
of the "public at large." Finally, both theories imply that constitu-
tional rules play a major role in setting the level of transaction costs
incurred as a prerequisite for a statute's passage. The preferences
of the "majority" are virtually irrelevant in determining legislative
outcomes. Instead, law is made by legislators whose primary goal is
to aggregate the political support they receive from competing spe-
cial interest group coalitions. Legal rules are generated by a process
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that conforms to standard microeconomic models of rationally self-
interested behavior.
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